



The Contracts Restatement of the American Law Institute, in six
hundred and nine black letter sections, with accompanying explanatory com-
ment and illustrations sets forth comprehensively the law of contracts. It
is for the most part intended to be inclusive in its provisions, with no "unpro-
vided case". In scope it includes Remedies, including Damages, Restitution
and Specific Performance, generally regarded as parts of the subjects of
Damages, Quasi Contracts and Equity; Interpretation and the Parol Evi-
dence Rule, regarded as parts of the law of Evidence. Many sections deal
with topics treated in Sales, Equity and other recognized divisions of the
law. It is a demonstration of the unity of the law, and the overlapping and
interrelation of conventional subjects and topics.
In form it is like a uniform state law with clarifying comment and
illustrations.' On the face of any particular section there is nothing to
indicate whether it states well settled law, or embodies a choice between one
or more conflicting rules, or is an extension into fields where authority is
lacking. It differs from a treatise or encyclopedia in not indicating conflicts
of authority and reasons for the solutions adopted. To determine wherein
they are supported by existing authority one is compelled to rely on the
various state annotations now in the course of preparation, or on other means
of finding local decisions and statutes.
The work is an expression of opinion of a group of leading American
legal scholars as to what the law should be found to be in an American court
not bound to follow the decisions of any particular state courts, but bound to
act in accordance with the "common law". Its authority depends upon its
source. The Restatement was for the most part initially drafted by Professor
Samuel Williston, of the Harvard Law School. The chapter on Remedies
was prepared by Professor Arthur Corbin of the Yale Law School. Assist-
ing these draftsmen, known as Reporters, was a committee of advisors, all
well known as experts in Contracts and related subjects.2 The drafts were
t A. B., 19o5, Brown University; LL. B., 19o9, S. J. D., 19,5, Harvard, University; Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; member of Pennsylvaniai bar; editor of CASES Ox
DAMAGES (1928), CLARx & MARSHA.LL, CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed. 1927), co-editor CASES ON
PARTNERSHIP (1924 and 193o), Pennsylvania annotator o~f the CoNTRAcrS RESTATEMENT;
contributor to numerous legal periodicals.
I "The Council of the American Law Institute considered the respective merits of care-
fully prepared treatises and the plan, actually adopted, and ultimately decided that increased
clearness, brevity, consistency, uniformity, and accessibility could best be achieved by putting
the Restatement in the form of concise rules analogous to those in a carefully drawn statute,
supplemented however, by comment and illustrations that would preclude as far as possible
doubts as to the exact meaning and effect of the rules." Williston, The Restatement of Con-
tracts (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 775, 777.
0 Zechariah Chafee, Jr. of Harvard, editor of casebooks on equity; Edgar N. Durfee of
Michigan, editor of a casebook on equity; Merton L. Ferson of Cincinnati, author of several
articles on contracts in legal periodicals; Dudley 0. McGovney of California, editor of a
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submitted to and approved by the Council of the Institute, composed of
eminent members of the American bench and bar. The tentative drafts were
then sent to members of the Institute, law school teachers, bar association
committees, and other interested persons, before submission to annual meet-
ings of the Institute where they were read and discussed section by section.
Since the work was started in 1923 and tentative drafts published, criticisms
and suggestions have been invited and in large numbers received and con-
sidered by the Reporters, the advisors and the Council, and many changes
have been made, especially of a verbal nature, before the final draft was
submitted and approved by the 1932 meeting of the Institute. Within the
time allotted nothing more could have been done to make this work the joint
product of those members of the legal profession who had any interest or
desire to take part in the enterprise. The extent to which it has already been
cited in opinions and used as a reference book in the law schools indicates
that it will soon be regarded as an authoritative source of the law.
Whether or not in cases of conflicting rules the Restatement embodies
the more desirable choice, it is probable that the courts will not blindly follow
the Restatement where in a particular jurisdiction a contrary rule has been
adopted by a considerable body of decisions. This was illustrated in Langel
v. BetZ,3 where the New York Court of Appeals, by an unanimous opinion,
in which Cardozo, C. J., an active member of the Council of the Institute,
joined, refused to follow Section 164, which is to the effect that an assignee
of a bilateral contract presumably assumes the performance of the assignor's
duties, because of the line of New York decisions to the contrary. On the
other hand, where the decisions of a jurisdiction are in a state of conflict or
confusion, and have been subjected to criticism as being out of line with the
current of authority elsewhere, the Restatement will doubtless have a unify-
ing influence and serve as a starting point for a new line of decisions, as in
the case of third party beneficiaries in Pennsylvania,4 and of relative rights
of successive assignees in New Jersey.5 It is the writer's intention to note
casebook on constitutional law and author of articles on contracts; William E. McCurdy of
Harvard, editor of a casebook on persons; William H. Page of Wisconsin, author of a treatise
on contracts; George J. Thompson of Cornell, compiler of SELECtrE READINGS ON CONTRACTS
(1931). Of great value were the services of William Draper Lewis, Director of the Insti-
tute, an experienced legislativd draftsman.
a25o N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 8go (1928).
'Book's Estate, 297 Pa. 543, 147 Atl. 6o8 (1929) ; Washington Steel Form Co. v. North
City Trust Co., 3o8 Pa. 351, 162 Atl. 829 (1932). In Saunders Co. v. Galbraith et al., 40
Ohio App. 155, 159, 178 N. E. 34, 35 (ig3I), (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 594, a case of
promissory estoppel, the court said, "By following the admirable notes of Professor Ferson it
would not be difficult to sustain the soundness of Section go as the boiled-down essence of the
law of Ohio. We are content, however, to take the restatement as the law of this state with-
out exploring its soundness, and hold that of its own vigor it is adequate authority. This is
not to say that the restatement is of necessity perfect, and that in it is to be found the law's
last word. We only hold that he who would not have it followed has the burden of demon-
strating its unsoundness."
I Moorestown Trust Co. v. Buzby, log N. J. Eq. 409, 157 Atl. 663 (1932), overruled a
previous decision and followed § 173, preferring a prior assignee over a second assignee who
had given prior notice to the debtor.
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some of the instances in which the Restatement has set forth solutions not
heretofore universally accepted, particularly by the Pennsylvania decisions
and statutes.
Chapter I contains definitions of terms used in the Restatement. Chap-
ter 2 contains a few general statements as to parties and in Section 17 asserts
the possibility of a contract between "two or more persons acting as a unit
and one or more but fewer than all of these persons, acting either singly or
with other persons". This is a departure from what has been said in many
of the older cases 6 but in accord with the modern view as contained in the
Uniform Interparty Agreement Act.
7
Chapter 3 deals with the fundamental elements of contract, manifesta-
tion of assent and consideration. As to assent, the so-called objective view
is followed,8 with a few expressed exceptions, that a contract results from a
concurrence of manifestations, though a concurrence of actual intent is
lacking.
Section 45 provides that where an offer for a unilateral contract is made
and the offeree performs or tenders part of the consideration, the offeror is
bound by a contract conditional on the full consideration being given or
tendered. This is in accord with decisions in cases of the estates of decedents
who have made charitable subscriptions, inducing desired action on the part
of the charity.9
Section 5o provides that an offer is terminated by the fact that before
acceptance the proposed contract becomes illegal. Manifestation of assent is
a requirement to be distinguished from legality of purpose 10 Not all illegal
contracts are null and void. Rights may exist in an innocent party, ignorant
of facts which make the contract illegal, or ignorant of special statutory or
executive regulations, Section 599. It would seem better to have said that
acceptance results in an illegal contract, and then the rights thereunder
depend upon the principles set forth under the topic Effect of Illegality, Sec-
tions 598-609.
Consideration, what it is and when it is necessary, is concisely treated
in Sections 75-84. It is of course necessary in a restatement of the law of
Contracts to deal with this requirement, but the form of the Restatement
seems unfortunate in respect to this topic, since it fails to show the trend of
'Price v. Spencer, 7 Phila. 179 (Pa. 1870), citing Bosanquet v. Wray, 6 Taunt. 597
(Eng. 1815) to the effect that in such agreement there is a defect of substance, not merely a
procedural difficulty. By Act of April 14, 1838, P. L. 457, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 12, § i5o, action may be brought where there is a non-common party on each side. The
common law seems to have been ignored, no misjoinder having been seasonably pleaded, in
Laughner v. Wally, 269 Pa. 5, 112 Atl. 1o5 (192o) (an action by three co-owners against one
of their number).
'May 13, 1927, P. L. 984, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 21, § 551 et seq.
" Whittler, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent (929) 17 CAMF. L. REV.
441. See Delaware L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Water Power & Supply Co., 227 Pa. 639, 76 Ati.
425 1910).
Converse's Estate, 24o Pa. 548, 87 Atl. 849 (1913). See also § go.
0§ 1 (b), (d).
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the decisions away from the insistence on a technical formal requirement to-
ward the enforcement of promises intended to be binding and which, as a
matter of social justice, ought to be binding.
Section 76 (a) makes the performance of a duty owed to the promisor
insufficient consideration, a rule in accordance with the legal detriment theory
of consideration, and in most cases socially just, but according to many
recent decisions not to be applied to situations where unforeseen difficulties
of performance are encountered, and the promise is no more than one of
indemnity against pecuniary loss." Performance of a contractual duty to a
third person is stated to be sufficient consideration.
12
Section 82 provides that the recital of consideration is inconclusive proof
of the fact. It has recently been held to the contrary in Real Estate Company
of Pittsburgh v. Rudolph.13  That it is economically desirable to enable
parties to bind themselves to a promise without consideration, where it is
apparent that they intend to be legally bound, has led the commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to recommend for adoption the Uniform Written Obli-
gations Act 14 drafted by Mr. Williston.
Under the sub-title of "Informal Contracts without Assent or Consider-
ation", Sections 85-94, are collected some of the common instances of inroads
on the conventional doctrine as set forth in the preceding sections. Promises
to pay debts barred by the Statute of Limitations, Section 86, or by discharge
in bankruptcy, Section 87, are said to be "binding". It is not made clear
whether the action should be brought on the old debt or the new promise."5
The doctrine of moral obligation as a substitute for consideration has had a
wider scope in Pennsylvania than elsewhere. Promises by a widow to per-
form a void promise made when a married woman, such as one of surety-
ship,'6 have been held "binding".
Section 90 sets forth a rule sometimes called "promissory estoppel", i. e.,
that a promise which is expected to and does produce substantial action on
the part of the promisee is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
" Cases supporting the more liberal view include Blakeslee v. Board of Water Commis-
sioners, io6 Conn. 642, 139 Atl. io6 (1927) ; Martiniello v. Bamel, 255 Mass. 25, I5o N. E. 838
(1926) ; Linz v. Schuck, io6 Md. 22o, 67 AtI. 286 (i9o7) ; King v. Duluth M. & N. Ry. Co.,
61 Minn. 482, 63 N. W. 11o5 (1895) ; Gardner, An Inquiry Into the Principles of the Laws
of Contracts (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1,37.
2§ 84. Accord: Avondale Marble Co. v. Wiggins, 12 Pa. Super. 577 (1goo) ; White-
house v. Green, 8I Pa. Super. 386 (923).
"301 Pa. 502, 153 Atl. 438 (193o) ; see (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1139.
" May 13, 1927, P. L. 985, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 33, § 6, stating a written
release or promise is not to be invalid for lack of consideration "if the writing also contains
an additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally
bound." See Note (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 58o; Note (1926) 21 ILL. L. Rlv. 185.
"An action on a promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy may be brought, but
not an action on the old discharged debt. Hobaugh. v. Murphy, 114 Pa. 358, 7 Atl. 139
(1886) ; Murphy v. Crawford, 114 Pa. 496, 7 Atl. 142 (1886).
"Young's Estate, 234 Pa. 287, 83 Atl. 2O (1912) ;. Rathfon v. Locher, 215 Pa. 571, 64
Atl. 79o (19o6). A parent's promise to compensate adult children for services rendered un-
der circumstances creating no legal obligation is binding. Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305, 5o Atl.
943 (1902).
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ment. This rule has been invoked to support many cases of charitable
subscriptions, followed by action of the charity in reliance thereon, 17 and has
recently been applied, citing this Section, to a promise of a pension to a retired
employee, conditioned on his continued loyalty and forbearing to accept
competitive employment.' For this rule to apply it must appear that some-
thing was done or foreborn by the promisee as a reasonable consequence
expected by the promisor. 9
Chapter 4, Sections 95-110, states the common law rules as to sealed
instruments. It is noted that in a large number of states (not including
Pennsylvania) there are statutory provisions doing away with the distinc-
tions between sealed and unsealed contracts, particularly as to the require-
ment of consideration. It is stated in Section IOI that a sealed promise can
be delivered conditionally to the promisee. This is not true in Pennsylvania
in the case of a deed.20  There is considerable authority in Pennsylvania in
accord with the statement in Section iO that consideration is unnecessary
for a sealed promise. Language in the opinion in a recent case appears to
throw some doubt on this rule, holding that on opening a judgment entered
by confession, lack of consideration can be shown. 21  It is not clear from the
record that there was any lack of consideration, however.
The common law of joint rights and joint obligations is the subject
matter of Chapter 5, Sections I 11-132. Statutory changes have been made
in nearly every state, including Pennsylvania.
22
Chapter 6, Sections 133-147, deals with third party beneficiaries. Cred-
itor beneficiaries and donee beneficiaries are stated to have rights to enforce
promises made for their benefit. In Pennsylvania enforceability by third
party beneficiaries has been for the most part limited to situations in which
a trust has been created, or a fund or property transferred by the promisee to
the promisor by means of which it is intended that the promise shall be per-
formed. In the leading case of Green County v. Southern Surety Co.,
23 the
-I President Board of Foreign Missions v. Smith, 209 Pa. 361, 58 Atl. 689 (19o4) ; Con-
verse's Estate, 240 Pa. 458, 87 AtI. 849 (1913) ; Univ. of Pa.'s Trustees v. Cox's Executor,
277 Pa. 512, 121 Atl. 314 (1923). See also Armstrong v. Levan, iog Pa. 77, 1 Atl. 2o4 (1885),
where a promise to pay compensation for a tort operated to enable the injured party to avoid
the bar of the statute of limitations, after forbearance.
IsLanger v. Superior Steel Corp., lO5 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Ati. 571 (1932), (1932) 32
COL L. REv. 1431. The case has been remitted to the common pleas court after overruling a
statutory demurrer and is awaiting trial.
9 Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Long, 3o9 Pa. 470, 164 Ati. 346 (1932).
Weisenberger v. Huebner, 264 Pa. 316, 107 Ati. 763 (1919).
SAusten v. Marzolf, 307 Pa. 232, 161 Atl. 72 (1932), (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 216.
= Section 119 provides that judgment against one or more joint obligors discharges the
joint duty of the others. This is changed by Act of April 6, 1830, P. L. 277, § I, PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 12, § 8oi, and Act of April iI, 1848, P. L. 536, § 5, PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, § 8o6. See Miller v. Reed, 27 Pa. 244 (1856). Section 125 provides
that the estate of a deceased joint promisor is not bound unless the survivors are insolvent,
nor in the event that the deceased promisor was a surety. This has been changed by Act of
April 11, 1848, P. L. 536, § 3, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, § 8o5, and Act of June
7, 1917, P. L. 447, § 35 (b), PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 772.
=292 Pa. 304; 141 Atl. 27 (927), (1928) 27 Mic H . L. REv. 200; (1928) 76 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 594- See also Note (932) 45 H Av. L. RFy. 1236; Corbin, Third Parties as Bene-
ficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds (1928) 38 YA L. J. i.
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decisions were reviewed, and it was held that materialmen had no rights
under a bond given by the contractor to the municipality, conditioned upon
payment of materialmen. The point decided has been changed by statute as
regards public contracts,24 and later cases have qualified the decision some-
what, in cases where the language of the bond more clearly indicates an
intention that materialmen shall have the power to enforce the bond.25  Other
recent decisions, citing Williston's treatise and the Restatement, indicate the
likelihood that Pennsylvania law on third party beneficiaries is in a process
of change, and is approaching the position taken in the Restatement.
26
Chapter 7, Sections 148-177, deals with assignment of rights and dele-
gation of duties or conditions. There are two difficult problems under this
topic. One is the relative rights of successive assignees for value. The
Restatement in Section 173 sets forth circumstances in which a subsequent
assignee is preferred, but does not include the case of a subsequent assignee
who gives notice to the obligor prior to notice being given by the first
assignee. In Pennsylvania, under those circumstances, the subsequent as-
signee would be preferred.2 7 In a gratuitous assignment, under Section 158,
if "the assigned right is evidenced by a tangible token or writing, the sur-
render of which is required by the obligor's contract for its enforcement, and
this token or writing is delivered to the assignee" the assignment is irrevo-
cable. This rule has not been applied in Pennsylvania to the gift of savings
bank deposits accompanied by delivery of the bank book 28 unless there is
also a written instrument of assignment. 29 Another problem is that of
whether an assignee of a bilateral contract presumably assumes the duty of
performance as is provided in Section 164, referred to supra.
Chapter 8, Sections 178-225, deals with the Statute of Frauds. The
provisions of the English Statute are set forth in substance, together with
their interpretation. It is noted that not all of the several sections of the
English Statute have been adopted in all the states. In Pennsylvania the
Statute of Frauds was not regarded as part of the received common law.3"
Act June 23, 1931, P. L. 1181, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 8, § 146.
Portland Sand & Gravel Co. v. Globe Indemnity CO., 301 Pa. 132, 151 Atl. 687 (193o);
Easton School District v. Continental Casualty Co., 304 Pa. 67, 155 Atl. 93 (1931).
Book's Estate; Washington Steel Form Co. v. North City Trust Co., both supra note 4.
nPhillips' Estate (No. 3), 205 Pa. 515, 55 AtI. 213 (19o3) ; First Nat'l Bank of Bangor
v. Bangor Trust Co., 297 Pa. 115, 146 Ati. 595 (1929). Cf. Moorestown Trust Co. v. Buzby,
supra note 5. But where an attachment by a judgment creditor of the assignor intervened
between the first assignment and a later assignment of which notice was given, the first as-
signee was preferred. Phillips' Estate (No. 4), 205 Pa. 525, 55 Atl. 216 (1903).
" Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177, 15 Atl. 47o (1888) ; Grigonis' Estate, 307 Pa. 183, x6o
AtI. 7o6 (1932).
IIn re Vance, io6 Pa. Super. 467, 162 Atl. 346 (1932). See Note (1932) 81 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 224.
1 Bell v. Andrews, 4 Dall. 152 (Pa. 1796) (a nisi prius proceeding before McKean, C. J.,
and Shippen and Smith, JJ.). See also Anonymous Case, i Dall. I (Pa. 1754), stating that
the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries does not extend to this province though made before the
Penn Charter, because the Duke of York exercised jurisdiction here prior to the Statute.
The Duke of York's Laws, 1676, set forth the requisites of a conveyance (Duke of
York's Laws, p. 23) but contained nothing regarding the requisites of a contract to convey.
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Classes I and II, contracts of an executor or administrator to answer for a
duty of the decedent's estate, and contracts to answer for the debt of another
were not adopted in Pennsylvania until 1855.31
Class III, contracts in consideration of marriage, has never been adopted
in Pennsylvania.
Class IV, contracts for the sale of an interest in land, has been adopted
in Pennsylvania, only for a short time, by an act of 1856,32 repealed the
following year.33  Pennsylvania in 1772 adopted an act requiring all interests
in land other than leases for less than three years to be assigned, granted or
surrendered, by deed or note in writing signed by the party so assigning,
granting or surrendering, or their agents thereto lawfully authorized by
writing.3 4 This statute has been judicially construed as applying to equitable
as well as legal interests, so that actions for specific performance of contracts
for the sale of land do not lie in the absence of a written agreement signed
by the grantor. The grantor in the case of an oral contract cannot recover a
conditional verdict in assumpsit for the purchase price,35 and the grantee
cannot by a plea to an action of ejectment secure specific performance.
3 6
The grantee is allowed to sue in assumpsit for damages for the grantor's
breach of the oral contract, but cannot recover damages based on the value
of the bargain, for that would be in effect specific performance; he can
recover only hand money paid, expense of searching title, and other expenses
incurred on the faith of the contract.
37
It is stated in the introductory Section 178 that "The following classes
of informal contracts are by statute unenforceable etc. . . ." Comment c
states "Formal contracts (enumerated in Section 7) are not affected by the
statute." It is true that a formal contract to pay money, such as a negotiable
instrument or a bond, is not affected by the provisions regarding promises to
pay the debt of another. But the memorandum relied upon to satisfy the
statute for the sale of land, may be a sealed agreement 38 yet it is subject to
These laws were extended to the territories on the Delaware by ordinance of Gov.
Andros, 1676 (id. 455). They were adopted by Penn on his arrival, and continued until re-
placed by the new code adopted at Chester (id. 298). The Statute of Frauds was enacted in
England in 1676, to take effect June 24, 1677.
Wharton's note in i Dall. i, suggests that the Statute of Frauds was not extended in
practice to Pennsylvania because its "provisions were inapplicable to the simplicity of the
earlier periods in Pennsylvania, and required greater expertness than the practitioners of
those days generally possessed."
" Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 308, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 33, § 3.
Act of April 22, 1856, P. L. 532, § 5.
" Act May 13, 1857, P. L. 5oo. The repeal seems to have been ignored in Connor's
Estate, 85 Pa. Super. 19, 23 (1925).
March 21, 1772, I Sm. L. 389, § I, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 33, § I.
*Semble: Ellet v. Paxson, 2 W. & S. 418 (1841).
Postlethwait v. Frease, 31 Pa. 472 (1858).
37 Seidlek v. Bradley, 293 Pa. 379, 142 Atl. 914 (1928), stating also that the measure of
damages is enlarged where the original contract is procured by fraud.
, Section 207. In Pennsylvania agreements for the sale of real estate when drawn by
attorneys or real estate brokers usually are sealed.
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the requirement that it state with reasonable certainty 89 the subject matter to
which the contract relates.40
As the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds as to land contracts merely pre-
vents the creation of an equitable interest save by a writing signed by the
grantor, it is unnecessary that any writing be signed by the grantee, although
he be the party to be charged.41
Chapter 9, Sections 226-249, is entitled "Scope and Meaning of Con-
tracts." It includes the matters of interpretation, parol evidence rule and
usage generally included under the subject of Evidence. It is from the lead-
ing work on this subject, Wigmore on Evidence, that the term "integration"
has been borrowed. Wigmore's first use of the word as a legal term is "The
Integration of the act [Jural Act] consists in embodying it in a single utter-
ance or memorial,--commonly, of course a written one." 42 The Restatement
defines the term in Section 228, "An agreement is integrated where the parties
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of
the agreement. An integration is the writing or writings so adopted." 43
In Section 229 it is stated that "Part of the terms of an agreement may be
integrated. . . ." It is unfortunate that the Institute should have found it
necessary to express the law in language as yet unfamiliar to the profession
at large, by the use of a term the legal significance of which is not ascertain-
able from its use in judicial opinions.
The sections on the parol evidence rule are in accord with the present
Pennsylvania law which has been subject to many fluctuations in the 
past. 44
The sections on interpretation of contracts contain many statements of
rules for the interpretation of integrated and unintegrated contracts. Each
statement is in itself supportable by authority. There is considerable varia-
tion apparent on the face of the decisions in regard to the approach to the
problem, as to what are primary and what are secondary rules. This part
of the Restatement seems to be somewhat over-mechanical in describing the
' Section 207.
10 A sealed option or other sealed land contract is within the statute. Barnes v. Rea, 219
Pa. 287, 296, 68 Atl. 839, 842 (i9o8) ; Tippins v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 415, 51 S. E. 410 (905) ;
Booth v. Milliken, 127 App. Div. 522, I1 N. Y. Supp. 791 (igoS). The statute requiring
signature, a sealed but unsigned deed is insufficient. Miller v. Rubbe, iO7 Pa. 395 (1884),
though at common law signing of a deed or bond is unnecessary. § 95, Comment b.
"Lowry v. Mehaffy, io Watts 387 (Pa. 1840) ; Brodhead v. Reinbold, 2o Pa. 618, 5o
AUt. 229 (go) ; Ottman v. Nixon-Nirdlinger, 301 Pa. 234, 15f At. 879 (1930). But see
Humphrey v. Brown, 291 Pa. 53, 139 Ati. 6o6 (1927) (apparently applying the statute to
vendee's contract made by an agent not authorized in writing).
'25 WIGMoRF, EviDENMc (2d ed. 1923) § 2401. In BIGaOw, BILLs, NOTES AND C3HECKS
(3d ed. 1928) § 131, it is said that incorporation by reference results in one writing being
integrated into another.
"The use of this term is explained in the introduction to the Restatement at xiii, § 28
being erroneously cited for § 228. The body of the Restatement is remarkably free from
typographical errors.
"Spier v. Michelson, 3o3 Pa. 66, 154 AtI. 127 (931). Folz, The Admissibility of Evi-
dence to Establish Oral Contemporaneous Inducing Promises to Affect Written Instruments
in Pennsylvania (1904) 52 U. OF PA. L. REv. 6oi; Harrison, Pennsylvania Rule as to the
Admissibility of Evidence to Establish Contemporaneous Inducing Promises to Affect Writ-
fen Instruments (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 235.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
process and in fixing the order in which various criteria are applied. The
Pennsylvania courts have emphasized the principle that the objective is to
ascertain the intention of the parties, using rules as an aid thereto. 45
Chapter io, Sections 250-311, is entitled "Conditions; and Breach of
Promise as an Excuse for Failure to Perform a Return Promise." Section
250 furnishes alternative definitions of a condition: a fact that must exist
before a duty of immediate performance arises, in which case the condition
is a "condition precedent" or will extinguish a duty to make compensation
for breach of contract after the breach has occurred, in which case the con-
dition is a "condition subsequent"; or a term in a promise providing that a
fact shall have such an effect. The opinions use the word condition in each
of these senses, as does the Restatement.
Topic 3, Sections 266-290, is a very lucid exposition of the modern law
of constructive conditions. There are occasional instances in the decisions of
confusion of failure of consideration which is a condition, Section 274, with
lack of consideration 4" necessary for initial validity of the contract.
Section 304 states that where defective performance of a condition is
tendered and rejected, the giving of an insufficient reason for rejection is
immaterial, unless it induces failure to make seasonably a sufficient tender
thereafter. The decisions have sometimes confused cases in which change
of position was so induced with those in which it was not.47
Under Chapter i i, Sections 312-325, entitled "Breach of Contract", the
most conspicuous feature is the disposition of the subject of anticipatory
breach. Under the Restatement repudiation in advance of performance of
a bilateral contract is a total breach, Section 318. The Pennsylvania decisions
require that the injured party should have acted on the repudiation for it to
be a breach.48 Under Section 320, manifestation by the injured party of a
purpose to allow or require performance does not nullify the effect of repudi-
ation as a breach. The contrary has been held in Pennsylvania. 49 It has even
been held that where the injured party does not act on the repudiation he
'Bubb v. Parker & Edwards Oil Co., 252 Pa. 26, 29, 97 Atl. 114, 115 (1916); White
H-eat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 555, lO9 Atl. 685, 686 (192o) ; Bangor Peerless
State Co. v. Bangor. Vein Slate Co., 270 Pa. 161, 165, 113 Atl. 19o, I91 (1931). "The history
of the law of Interpretation is the history of a progress from a stiff and superstitious for-
malism to a flexible rationalism." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2461. Cf. § 231,
Illustration 2, to the effect that a private code orally agreed upon that "buy" in a telegram
means "sell" is ineffective, with Wigmore's more liberal view in 5 WIGMNORE, EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1923) §§ 2462, 2463, n. II.
" See Allshouse's Estate, 3o4 Pa. 481, 156 At. 69 (i93i).
"Freedman v. Fire Association of Phila., 168 Pa. 249, 32 Atl. 39 (895); Popper v.
Rosen, 292 Pa. 122, 14o Atl. 774 (1928) ; Emerson Shoe Co. v. Gruskin et al., 86 Pa. Super.
296 (1925).
'5Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. 541, 545 (i88i) ; Maguire v. Johnston, 207 Pa. 592, 57 At.
64 (1904).
"'Barber Milling Co. v. Leichthammer, 273 Pa. 73, II6 Atl. 677 (1922); Frank Pure
Food Co. v. Dodson, 281 Pa. 125, 130, 126 Atl. 243, 246 (1924) ; McCormick v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 307 Pa. 434, 161 At. 532 (1922).
THE CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT
must tender performance regardless of the repudiation,5" but this rule appears
to be, so far as sales of goods contracts go, directly contrary to the provisions
of the Sales Act."
Chapter 12, Sections 326-384, is entitled "Judicial Remedies for Breach
of Contract." Damages, restitution and specific performance are presented
as the three remedies available. It is not usual to consider these matters as a
part of the subject of Contracts in law school courses or in text books, but it
seems desirable to do so. The topic of restitution is very well presented, and
it is likely to call to the attention of teachers, students and attorneys the
bearing on the law of contracts of various rules heretofore relegated to quasi-
contracts and equity classifications.
Non-performance of a contract within the Statute of Frauds is not a
breach of contract, as defined in Section 312. But in some circumstances the
contract may be specifically enforced,52 though damages cannot be given, and
even though other remedies are unavailable that of restitution can be had.53
In Pennsylvania the vendee's remedy for non-performance of an oral con-
tract to convey land is an action for damages on the contract, as has been
stated, supra, in connection with the Statute of Frauds topic.
The tardy development of equity procedure in Pennsylvania has re-
sulted in specific performance being granted through legal forms of action,
such as assumpsit and ejectment. Actions in equity for specific performance
often fail because the legal remedies are adequate, such remedies being not
merely damages, but equitable relief through legal forms.s3a
Chapter 13, Sections 385-453, is entitled "Discharge of Contracts."
Herein are gathered together and concisely stated a number of rules on
various methods of discharge of contracts. Chapter 14, Sections 454-469,
deals with impossibility, and its effect as a cause of discharge.
Chapter 15, Sections 470-491, deals with fraud and misrepresentation.
Section 473 adopts the rule that "A contractual promise made with the inten-
tion of not performing it is fraud." The Pennsylvania cases have not gone
so far as this.5 4 Section 488 provides for restitution to the injured party in
r Huessener v. Fishel & Marks Co., 281 Pa. 535, 127 Atl. 139 (1924) ; Fairfax Textile
Mills, Inc. v. Feingold, 273 Pa. 73, 116 Atl. 525 (1922).
uThe Sales Act, May ig, 1915, P. L. 543, § 64 (4), PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit.
69, § 293.
Section 197. In Pennsylvania there must be not only possession by the grantee, open
and exclusive, but expenditures in the making of improvements which cannot be adequately
compensated in damages. McKowen v. McDonald, 43 Pa. 441 (1862); Whiting & Co. v.
Pitts. Opera House Co., 88 Pa, ioo (1878) ; Piatt v. Seif, 2o7 Pa. 614, 57 Atl. 68 (1904);
Parry v. Miller, 247 Pa. 45, 93 Atl. 30 (1915).
r Section 355.
1 See Smaltz's Appeal 99 Pa. 310 (1882) ; Dalzell v. Crawford, i Pars. Eq. Cas. 37
(Pa. 1842).
Smith v. Smith, Murphy & Co., 21 Pa. 367 (1853); Backentoss v. Speicher, 31 Pa. 324
(1858) ; Penn Lumber Co. v. Hanover Bending & Mfg. Co., 96 Pa. Super. 16 (1929). Cf.
Harner v. Fisher, 58 Pa. 453 (1868) ; Cincinnati Cooperage Co. v. Gaul, 17o Pa. 545 (895) ;
Allen et aL. v. Sarshik, 299 Pa. 257, 148 Atl. 25 (193o) (criticising rule of older decisions and
distinguishing facts of instant case).
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cases of contracts voidable for fraud or misrepresentation. Section 499 pro-
vides, by cross reference to this section, for a similar remedy in cases of duress
and undue influence; the subject matter of Chapter 16, Sections 492-499.
The chapter on mistake, Chapter 17, Sections 500-511, makes no provision
for restitution in cases of part performance of a contract voidable for mistake,
concerning which there is an abundance of authority.
Chapter 18, Sections 512-6o9, the final chapter, is entitled "Illegality."
It is admitted in the comment 55 that not all kinds of illegal contracts can be
listed, but the more usual varieties are included. In accordance with the
common law, bargains for arbitration are stated to be not specifically enforc-
ible.50 Under a recent statute, they are enforcible in Pennsylvania 57 as in
some other states. Section 548 (I) provides that a bargain in which either
a promised performance or the consideration for a promise is concealing or
compounding a crime or alleged crime is illegal. The matter is also dealt with
under the chapter on duress, Section 493- In Pennsylvania the use of crim-
inal process as a means of enforcing civil liabilities not only is a common
practice but has legislative approval 58 in regard to some offenses.
The remarkable thing about the Restatement is not its departure from
the body of the law of any particular state in many particulars, but the fact
that the law of contracts of so many jurisdictions is so nearly identical that
the Restatement is possible, and that the choices made between conflicting
views have met the approbation of such a body of persons learned in the law
as the members of the American Law Institute. The Restatement is on the
whole a statement of the law of today. It is better that it should be taken
for what it is, the consensus of scholarly opinion, than that it should be
enacted as a code, for the courts should remain free, as in the past, to develop
in accordance with economic and social needs the solution of contract prob-
lems, without being rigidly restricted by stare decisis or by legislation.
Section 512, Comment b.
Section 550.
uAct April 25, 1927, P. L. 381, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 5, § 161.
' Act March 31, 186o, P. L. 427, § 9, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 19, § 491. See
Geier v. Shade, lO9 Pa. 18o (1885) ; Rothermal v. Hughes, 134 Pa. 510, i9 Ati. 677 (i89o);
Brown v. McCreight, 187 Pa. 181, 41 AtI. 45 (1898) ; Moyer v. Dodson, 212 Pa. 344, 61 Ati.
937 (1905).
